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Estimation of the Nonmarket Benefits
of Agricultural Land Retention in
Eastern Canada
J.M. Bowker and D.D. Didychuk
We assess the nonmarket value for retention of farmland in the Moncton area of New
Brunswick. We examine a number of factors explaining household external values for
farmland preservation and expand on previous work by Beasley et al., Bergstrom et al., and
Halstead. Our findings indicate that the marginal external benefit of preserving farmland in
general in this region is small compared to the market price and that spatial embedding is not
automatic in contingent valuation studies
The sagacious utilization and management of the
land resource is essential to realizing the social,
political, and economic goals of a society (Envi-
ronment Canada). Since the seventies, there has
been considerable concern about the conversion of
farmland and availability of open space in the
United States and Canada (Collins; Conklin and
Lesher). Much of the interest centers around the
irreversible conversion of agricultural land along
suburban or urban fringes to housing subdivisions
and commercial developments.
Public concern for retention of land loss is evi-
denced by established public and private programs
in a number of states and provinces, including On-
tario, British Columbia, and a number of states
which provide for greenways or corridors of unor-
ganized open space. Such programs can be expen-
sive to establish and administer (Beasley et al.).
While estimating the costs of establishing these
programs in populated areas is relatively simple,
valuing the extra-market benefits is more problem-
atic. Private land markets are usually efficient in
allocating land according to marginal values in
various productive uses leading to traded commod-
ities such as timber, crops, and grazing rights,
along with housing and urban development. How-
ever, when public goods aspects of land are con-
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cerned, market allocations may deviate substan-
tially from social optima (Crosson, Gardner).
Gardner (p. 1028) lists a number of social ben-
efits provided by retaining agricultural land includ-
ing food and fiber provision, local economic ben-
efits derived from a viable agricultural sector, open
space and other environmental amenities, and
more orderly and fiscally sound urban develop-
ment, He goes on however, to make a strong case
that the market is most likely dealing efficiently
with all of the above benefits except open space
and associated environmental amenities.
The benefits of agricultural land retention in the
face of conversion to urban and other uses have
been assessed by a number of researchers (Beasley
et al,; Bergstrom et al.; and Halstead). However,
no empirical studies of the external value of agri-
cultural land retention have been done for regions
in Canada. In this paper we examine the nonmar-
ket value for retention of farmland in the Moncton
area of New Brunswick, This area, including
Kent, Albert and Westmorland counties is one of
three major population centers in the Province.
Additionally, it is considered to be among the top
ten areas in Canada for economic expansion and
development. In recent years, this area has expe-
rienced rapid urban and industrial development re-
sulting in a loss of approximately 397,000 acres of
farmland from a base of 492,300 acres in 1961.
The primary objective of this paper is to mea-
sure the external benefits of farmland preservation
in a subregion of Eastern Canada. Secondary ob-
jectives include examining factors explaining indi-
vidual household external benefits and expanding
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al,; and Beasley et al, In particular, we (a) provide
estimates and corresponding confidence intervals
for regional and household average and marginal
benefits for preserving agricultural land, (b) pro-
vide evidence that contingent valuation studies are
not necessarily plagued by embedding, and (c) de-
scribe and employ procedures immune to potential
dependency problems in the observed dependent
variables found in earlier works.
Methods and Data
Nonmarket methodologies have evolved as an al-
ternative approach to obtain money-metric esti-
mates of benefits (costs) to households and indi-
viduals of natural resource related programs or pol-
icy changes when markets are incomplete. Young
and Allen provide a theoretical and conceptual dis-
cussion specific to country-side amenity valuation
and the use of nonmarket techniques. They con-
clude that behavior-based valuation approaches
such as travel cost and hedonic pricing methods are
inferior to contingent valuation which is an in-
tended behavior approach. They argue that travel
cost will likely understate amenity values when
nonuse or passive use value is significant. Further,
they argue that no obvious set of market goods
exists which would contain the necessary informa-
tion to apply the hedonic pricing method in a way
in which nonuse value would be captured. They
conclude that if benefits are limited to recreation,
either travel cost or hedonic pricing would be ap-
propriate. However, for environmental change
“outside historical experience” or where there are
“considerable indirect benefits, ” they advocate
the use of contingent valuation. Adamowicz, sim-
ilarly concludes that while appealing, behavioral
approaches are generally limited to applications
seeking use values.
Theoretically, values elicited via CVM approx-
imate Hicksian welfare measures and may be rep-
resented in a number of ways consistent with the
utility maximization problem in macroeconomics
(Mitchell and Carson, p. 26). In an indirect utility
framework, WTP or equivalent surplus may be
represented for the farmland retention case as,
VO(YO-WTP, AQO,Po) = VO(YO, AQ1, Po), where Y
is income, AQOis a state where a given amount of
farmland is preserved in the region, AQ1 is a state
with a reduced amount of farmland resulting from
no guarantee that any farmland would be retained,
and P is a price vector for various market goods.
Despite over 1100 studies in published sources
(Carson et al.), and considerable evolution since
the sixties, debate continues among practitioners
as to the best structure within CVM for the data
collection method, elicitation approach, hypothet-
ical market, payment vehicle, and questionnaire
design. Such debate suggests the difficulty of de-
fining an objective and standard set of CVM op-
erating procedures. Subsequent to our study, the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (NOAA) convened a panel of distin-
guished economists to assess CVM as an environ-
mental damage assessment tool, particulady for
measuring passive-use values potentially admissi-
ble in court (Arrow et al.). In general, they con-
cluded that if conservatively applied, CVM could
be used as a starting point for resolving legal dis-
putes. Overall, their recommended procedures fol-
low those discussed in Mitchell and Carson.
Previous studies of agricultural land retention
valuation have employed CVM in different ways.
Beasley et al. and Halstead used variations of the
iterative bidding approach with a short text and
pictures to value the avoidance of alternative land
development scenarios in south-central Alaska and
western Massachusetts, respectively. Bergstrom et
al. used a mail-back open-ended approach to mea-
sure the environmental amenity benefits of agricul-
tural land in Greenville County, South Carolina,
partitioning their sample across payment vehicles
and providing a treatment for different information
levels. 1A noteworthy point is that in each of the
above studies every respondent bid on all of the
considered scenarios.
We employ a version of the payment card con-
tingent valuation method (Mitchell and Carson,
Cameron and Huppert) to elicit household willing-
ness-to-pay to preserve given units of the Moncton
area farmland base. A number of recent studies
have used this approach to value other environ-
mental goods (Cameron and Huppert; Reiling et
al.; Roberts et al.; Bowker and MacDonald). Al-
though generally recommended by the NOAA
panel, we chose not to use the dichotomous choice
approach for various reasons including the neces-
sity of larger samples (Cameron and James) and
the problem of yea-saying (Mitchell and Carson).
1It is not clear to us exactly what Bergstrom et al. did regardins
information. On p. 143 they dkcuss separate groups receiving different
bitsofinformation withabinaryvariable ineachpayment vehiclemodel
to capturethe effectof thosereceivingaddkionalinformation. More
information led to significantly lower bids,however thereappeam tobe
adependency problem sincerespondents firstbidonapackage contain-
ing “all the benetita” and then on a reduced package with only envi-
ronmental amenities. Under such conditions, itisnotsurprising thatthe
additional information led to lower bids.220 October 1994 Agricultural aud Resource Economics Review
Moreover, recent empirical work by Holmes and
Kramer indicates that dichotomous choice may be
biased in certain circumstances from lexicographic
preferences. Budgetary constraints and the lack of
an experienced bid elicitor precluded our use of
iterative bidding.
The contingent market mechanism involved an-
nual payment into a tax-exempt trust with each
respondent bidding on one of four acreage reten-
tion quantities (see Appendix). Halstead felt that
his use of a tax mechanism may have caused an
excessive number of zero bids. However, Berg-
strom et al. found no significant difference be-
tween trust and tax payment vehicles. While a trust
is somewhat unrealistic, a payment vehicle involv-
ing increased tax payments was abandoned be-
cause of a strong and pervasive antagonistic atmo-
sphere towards taxes created by the controversial
and recently implemented federal goods and ser-
vices sales tax (GST).
By bidding on only one of four randomly as-
signed quantities, the study incorporates an inter-
nal check for “warm glow” and or embedding
effects. If a respondent’s bid is simply to generate
a good feeling about donating to a worthy cause,
then mean bids for each of the different amounts
would be indistinguishable or possibly of a counter
intuitive magnitude. In a WTP regression context,
the quantity of land regressor would be insignifi-
cant or possibly of the wrong sign. Similarly, if
embedding, which occurs when the respondent
includes values for other entities in their bid for
the relevant good were to be a serious problem
(Kahnemann and Knetsch), mean bids or the quan-
tity of land regressor would be plagued by insig-
nificance or the wrong sign. As the NOAA panel
points out, if an individual were to bid on all of the
quantities, then the embedding issue would be
forcibly avoided, which is highly undesirable (Ar-
row et al., p. 27).
Survey Design
Dillman stresses the importance of giving careful
attention to such matters as question order and use
of lead-ins and transitions in questionnaire con-
struction. Our questionnaire began with a cover
letter detailing the aspects of farmland retention
and explaining the loss of external benefits. The
respondent was then asked to answer several pref-
erence/attitude type questions to give a smooth
transition to the CVM question. The survey was
developed with the assistance of a number of aca-
demics, including economists (pro and anti-CVM)
and a rural sociologist. In addition, the survey was
pretested on-site as well as on a number of under-
graduate students. An open-ended approach was
used in the pretest to establish a viable bid range
for the payment card.2
A systematic sample (Cochran) of 140 house-
holds in the affected area was conducted. Four
representative residential areas were selected,
within which households were randomly sampled.
Dillman discusses the merits of mail, telephone,
and face-to-face survey techniques and concludes
that the question of which is best can only be an-
swered subjectively and on a case-by-case basis.
We chose a modified face-to-face interview ap-
proach. The literature indicates that personal inter-
views generally produce higher response rates than
mail surveys (Mitchell and Carson) and it is the
preferred method according to the NOAA panel.
Funding and time constraints were also contribut-
ing factors.
We expected respondents to be unfamiliar with
CVM surveys in general and with valuing the ex-
ternal benefits of agricultural land in particular.
The face-to-face format allowed for clarification
and explanation if requested. All households were
subject to the same experienced interviewer. How-
ever, to avoid interviewer bias and social desirabil-
ity biases, each interview was structured so that the
respondent (adult household member) had the op-
tion of privately recording her responses and plac-
ing the completed questionnaire among a stack of
completed and unlabeled responses, thus contrib-
uting to the perception of anonymity.
Empirical Model
Our empirical model builds on the previous work
of Beasley et al., Bergstrom et al., and Halstead.
Our choice of variables is for the most part con-
sistent with these previous studies with a few ex-
ceptions. The specification for the empiricai model
of the total value (WTP) curve is:
(1) WTP, = B. + B,LAC + B21NC + B3CSG
+ B4DIS •1-BJIGR + BJWJM
+ B7VIS + Ui
2 One reviewer felt strongly that we should have used focus groups to
develop our survey instrument, In retrospect, additional information
fmm an accepted focus group technique would likely have improved our
questionnaire. However, then as now, we sre unaware of an unambig-
uous focus group standard. In light of our pretesting and interview ap-
proach, we feel the study is minimally compromised. Nevertheless, were











total annual household willingness to
pay for a given amount of farmland
land preservation;
log of the amount of farmland to be
preserved, 23,750; 47,500; 71,250; or
95,000 acres;
household income level ($/year);
affiliation with conservation-type orga-
nizations (O = no, 1 = yes);
distance to the nearest parcel of farm-
land (km):
farm background (O = no, 1 = yes);
number of people in household;
visit farmland (O = no, 1 = yes);
i.id. mean zero random error,
Halstead and Beasley et al. use a “level of
development” variable in lieu of acreage, which
precludes derivation of preservation values at the
margin. We follow Bergstrom et al. and include a
quantity of land variable to establish a total value
curve. In addition, we impose structure consistent
with diminishing marginal utility by using a loga-
rithmic transform on acres.
A number of shift variables were included based
on previous studies including income, distance,
and farm background. Halstead and Bergstrom et
al. found income to be significant, but Beasley et
al. did not. Following Haistead, we also included
a distance variable. Bergstrom et al. used an urban/
rural indicator variable similarly. Beasley et al.
suggested that a cardinal distance measure was not
appropriate in their study because all households
were interspersed with farmland parcels in the
area. Farm background was found to be insignifi-
cant by Bergstrom et al., however we chose to
retain it in our model under the pretext that people
with farm backgrounds might react differently to
agricultural land preservation than those without.
A priori expectations were that income and farm
background would shift the total value curve up-
Table 1. Selected Sample Statistics, N = 93
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ward while distance could be argued to shift the
curve either way.
We also included a number of variables absent
from previous land studies. Because household
values were elicited, we included a variable to ac-
count for the number of people in the household. A
binary variable for affiliation with a wide range of
conservation-type organizations was included
based on its significance in other environmental
valuation studies (Bowker and Stoll), Another bi-
nary variable to identify direct users of the land
was also included. Such a variable, if significant,
would potentially allow for direct use and option-
to-use value to be separated from more passive
values such as existence, and bequests by subtract-
ing mean WTP for those who claimed not to di-
rectly use the resource from who did. A priori, we
expected household number and both of the binary
variables to positively influence willingness to
pay.
Results
A total of 140 households were sampled; 38 re-
fused interviews, 1response was incomplete and 9
were determined to be protest bids based on a fol-
low-up question to zero bidders. The protest bids
were discarded from the sample. As discussed by
Halstead et al., this procedure is not unambigu-
ously preferred. However, because protests were
less than ten percent of the sample and response
rates were reasonably high, we feel discarding the
protests is more justifiable than either treating
them as zeroes or worse, assigning sample mean
WZ’Pvalues to them. This left 92 usable surveys.
Selected sample statistics are reported in Table 1.
For payment card data, Cameron and Huppert
suggest a maximum likelihood alternative to ordi-
nary least squares if intervals are ‘coarse’, We felt
this procedure to be unnecessary given the number
of intervals and option for respondents to fill in
values between intervals. Regression model ordi-
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
LAc 3.9566 .5298 3.1676 4.5539
BGR .35484 .48106 0 1
EDU 14.043 2.1054 10 21
INC 42742 20490 15000 95000
NUM 2.7957 1.2646 1 8
D[S 12.527 12.315 0 100
VIS .7634 .42727 0 1
CSG .16129 .36979 0 1222 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 2. OLS Regression Parameter
Estimates for the Dependent Variable WTP
(N = 93)
T-ratio White’s









































nary least squares (OLS) parameter estimates are
presented in Table 2.3 The model R* of .52 indi-
cates a fit which is a considerable improvement on
previous studies (e.g., Bergstrom et al. (. 14); Hal-
stead (.09–.38); Beasley et al. (.21–.30)).
All of the model variables are highly significant
with the exception of income (lNC) and farm back-
ground @GR).4 The income result appears to con-
tradict theory, however a number of CVM studies
have also found income to be insignificant in ex-
plaining WTP for environmental goods and ser-
vices. Both of the Beasley et al. models and some
of the Halstead models had insignificant income
variables. Beasley et al. suggest that since money
does not actually change hands, poor people may
be as “profligate” as rich people. We feel this
variable is best left in the model due to potential
theoretical importance and because overspecifica-
tion presents fewer estimator problems than under-
specification.
Consistent with Bergstrom et al. the farm back-
ground variable @GR) was insignificant. The re-
sult runs contrary to popular beliefs that farmers or
3 It should be noted that a Tobit model of the same concomitant
variable specification was estimated because of possible censoring prob-
lems caused by eight out of ninety-two respondents reporting WTP’S of
zero dolhtrs, The coefficient estimates and significsnces are remarkably
siruilsr with significant estimates exhibiting less than a 5 percent differ-
ence in all cases. The uncensored overall mean WTPis $70.20 whtle the
censored mean (Greene, p. 728) is $69.74.
4 The presence of multicollinearity was not considered to be problem-
atic based on examination of the matrix of simple correlations between
independent variables and on a series of auxillary regressions among
independent variables, Homoscedasticity was rejected based on the re-
sults of the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test (Greene, p. 421 ), although
plots of squared residuals vs. predicted showed no readily identifiable
patterns. Normality of the residuals could not be rejected based on
Greene’s test (p.329), hence OLScoefficient estimates sre unbiased but
not their variances. White’s generalized covariance-matrix estimator
(Greene, p. 420) was then employed producing resulting significance
quite similar to the OLScovariance matrix (Table 2).
people with farm backgrounds value land and open
spaces different y than society in general. Alterna-
tive explanations such as farmers having an eco-
nomic interest (positive or negative) in the pro-
gram may also be dismissed.
Sixteen percent of the sample claimed some
household involvement in a conservation-type or-
ganization (CSG). As seen in Table 2, the coeffi-
cient on this binary variable is large and highly
significant suggesting previous reported models
may have been mispecified by omitting such a
v~able. Our survey admittedly did not-quantify
the level or intensity of involvement, so a more
detailed look into organizational involvement is
suggested for future work. This would be particu-
larly important if a large enough proportion of the
sample is involved to allow appropriate stratifica-
tion.
Seventy-six percent of the respondents claimed
to visit open spaces within the area at least once a
year. As with the conservation variable, this vari-
able (VIS) was omitted in urevious work but
highly significant in our mod~l. One could argue
that this variable is simply an attitude or experi-
ence indicator however, we feel it potentially rep-
resents more. For example, the twenty-nine dollar
difference in mean WTP between those who claim
to visit the land and those who do not may be
considered a crude estimate of the difference be-
tween those with on-site use and option-to-use val-
ues in addition to nonuse values and those with
primarily nonuse values. The alternative is to fol-
low the work by Walsh et al. and differentiate
between use and nonuse values by asking respon-
dents to assign percentages of the total bid to use
and various nonuse values such as o~tion. exis- . .
tence, and bequest values. At a minimum our re-
sults indicate that this variable merits further ex-
ploration and refinement in future studies and
could perhaps be used as a reliability check on the
Walsh et al. method.
The distance (DLS)parameter estimate was also
significant. Each added kilometer increased annual
household WTP about one dollar. This corrobo-
rates the hypothesis that promity may lead to a
take-it-for-granted attitude (Bergstrom et al., p.
144). Halstead found distance to be significant in
some of his models, however with near-zero value,
he considered the effect trivial.
Also absent from other models but significant in
our model is the household number variable
(NUM). We found additional household members
to add around eleven dollars to annual household
WTP. Previous studies for land retention as well as
many other household based valuation studies omitBowker and Didychuk Nonmarket Benefits of Agricultural Land Retention 223
this potentially important variable. Possible expla-
nations for the importance of this variable include
added on-site use value as well as increased option
and family bequest considerations.
Finally, the acreage variable (LAC)was positive
and significant at better than the one-percent level.
The logarithmic transform on this variable is theo-
retically consistent in that it allows for the bid
curve to increase at a decreasing rate with acreage
retained. Table 3 contains the marginal household
and marginal regional WTP per 1000-acre incre-
ment. Additionally, while validation of CVM mea-
sures is subject to intense debate, our findings on
this variable bode well for CVM in light of spatial
embedding criticisms (Kahnamen and Knetsch).
An important distinction of our survey is that each
household bid on only one quantity of land. Nev-
ertheless, a very strong positive relationship to
WTP was identified leading us to believe that peo-
ple were not stating values for land retention in
general and likely not just purchasing moral satis-
faction.
Bergstrom et al. also found a similar strong pos-
itive relationship between WTP and acreage. How-
ever, their results are somewhat suspect from
methodological and statistical standpoints. In their
survey, each respondent was given all of the acre-
age amounts to be valued in increasing order, and
hence provided four observations. Such a proce-
dure forcibly avoids embedding and has been out-
rightly rejected by the NOAA panel (Arrow et al.,
p. 27), Moreover, because they estimated their bid
curve as if each response was a separate observa-
tion, the independent error assumption for OLS is
violated, leading to a downward bias on the esti-
mated regression parameter standard errors and in-
creases the chances of Type I error. Beasley et ai.
and Halstead did not model incremental quantities
of land but elicited bids from each respondent to
avoid increasing levels of development on a fixed
quantity of land. As such, each respondent’s bid is
conditioned by her seeing ail of the scenarios.
Hence, when a bid of $100 is offered to avoid a
low level of development, it is virtuaily guaranteed
that a bid of more than $100 will be offered to
avoid a higher level of development. Moreover, an
independence problem similar to that in Bergstrom
et al. arises when the authors regress WTP on their
variable representing the level of development be-
cause they included multiple WTP observations
from each individual. Under such conditions, two
analytical approaches are appropriate: (a) ran-
domly select only one observation from each re-
spondent and proceed with OLS estimation, or (b)
employ an estimated generalized least squares pro-
cedure to account for the correlation among the
four observations from each respondent (see
Hoehn or Judge et al., pp. 519-551). Using one
alternative per respondent or, in some cases, ran-
domly ordering questions are perhaps better ways
to mitigate the dependence problem.
Conclusions and Implications
As indicated in Table 3, the household WTP’S for
the amenities provided by preserving 23,750;
47,000; 71,250; and 95,000 acres of farmland in
the greater Moncton area are $49.07, $67.64,
$78.49, and $86.20 respectively. Ninety-five per-
cent prediction intervals for regression means
(Greene, p. 195) are also reported in Table 3.
At first glance these numbers may seem high but
with roughly 95,000 acres left, the marginal ame-
nity value per household is only twenty-eight cents
per 1000 acres with an average value of about
ninety-one cents per 1000 acres. With half the
acreage, the marginal value doubles while the av-
erage value increases to $1.42 per 1000 acres.
Based upon an estimate of 34,740 households in
the three-county area, regionai total amenity val-
ues for 23,750; 47,500; 71,250; and 95,000 acres
are about $1.7, $2.3, $2.7, and $3.0 million, re-
spectively (Table 4). Under existing conditions,
the marginal value is $9727 per 1000 acres or
about $9.70 per acre, while the average value is
$31.52 per acre.
Our household WTP at existing conditions is
about five times that of Bergstrom et al., while our
regionai per acre benefits are quite close. At the
margin however, our results are much lower for
households, a good part of which may be due to
model specification differences. Because of meth-
odological differences, it is more difficult to com-
pare our results in a specific way to Halstead or
Beasley et al. A conservative estimate of the cur-
Table 3. Household WTP for Retaining
Farmland
House 95% PI 95% PI Ave.1 Marg.2
Acres WTP Lower Upper WTP WTP
23,750 $49.07 $31.48 66.67 $2.07 $1.14
47,500 67.64 58.00 77.27 1.42 .56
71,250 78.49 67.38 89.60 1.10 .38
95,000 86.20 71.51 100.88 .91 .28
lHousehold average WTP per 1000 acres with concomitant
variables set at sample means.
2Householdmarginal WTP per 1000acres.224 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 4. Regional WTP for Retaining Farmlandl
Region 95% PI 95% PI Ave.2
Acres WTP
Marg.3
Lower Upper WTP WTP
23,750 $1704692 $1093615 $2316116 $71777 $39604
47,500 2349814 2014920 2684360 49470 19454
71,250 2726743 2340781 3112704 38270 13201
95,000 2994588 2485300 3504571 31522 9727
‘Based on 1986 Census estimate of 34,740 households.
‘Average regional WTP per 1000acres.
3Marginalregional WTP per 1000 acres.
rent price of typical agricultural land in the Monc-
ton area is approximately $600-$1000 per acre.
Land in prime locations and frontal lots is priced in
the $1200-$1400 range (LeMarsh). Our findings
indicate that at the margin, regional extra-market
benefits of retaining farmland are about $97 per
acre or about 6 to 16 percent of land price.5 The
estimate of $97 is probably an upper bound given
that CVM tends to overstate “real” willingness to
pay (Arrow et al., p. 8). Our relatively conserva-
tive result suggests that the land market is, for
now, probably not wrought with externality from
the standpoint of providing extramarket benefits to
the public.
Interestingly, almost a decade later, our results
appear qualitatively similar to Bergstrom et al. and
Beasley et al. But, as open land becomes more
scarce in the region and surrounding areas and per-
haps as public attitudes about the environment
evolve, the temporal robustness of our results
would become suspect. However, under existing
conditions, marginal extra-market benefits of
farmland retention appear small compared to land
prices and the potential costs of establishing a pres-
ervation program in the region. In this light, a
general farmland preservation program would
seem for now socially unwarranted.
It should be noted, that our conclusions are lim-
ited to a general land preservation program and
condhioned by a number of caveats. We did not
consider specific parcels of land nor did we differ-
entiate qualitatively among farmland types, e.g.,
pasture, row crop, orchard, mixed and others.
Also, other than a continuation of the current
trend, we did not explicitly describe the kind or
level of development which would supplant the
farmland. As Beasley et al. and Halstead have
shown, this could be an important factor, particu-
larly if specific types of development are of con-
cern.
5 Based on an interest rate of 10 percent and a perpetual aunuity
payment.
APPENDIX
From the cover letter . . .
Each year portions of private agricultural land
are converted to alternative uses such as industri-
alization and urban subdivisions. In the Moncton
area (including Kent, Albert, and Westmorland
counties) there was a total of 492,300 acres of
agricultural land in 1961; in 1976 there was a total
of 234,700 acres. There are presently 95,000 acres
of agricultural land in this area.
Although we produce more food than ever in
Canada, we maybe losing certain external benefits
this land provides. These external benefits can in-
clude open space, scenic vistas, wildlife habitat,
and traditional country life.
From the payment card question . . .
Our main interest is examining the value which
people place on preserving agricultural land for
external benefits. The next question presents a sit-
uation which asks for your best estimation of how
you would react in given circumstances. This sit-
uation does not represent any actual policy pro-
posals under consideration.
Assume that a tax exempt, independent founda-
tion could be successfully established to ensure the
continued preservation of approximately _ or
_ acres of the existing 95,000 acres.
What is the maximum annual contribution your
household would make to such a foundation?
$0 10 50 200
1 15 75 300
2 20 100 400
5 25 150 other $ _ .
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